- Admin
- #1
Is General Motors Worth Saving?
By Bill Saporito Thursday, Nov. 13, 2008
For months, General Motors had been telling everyone who would listen that bankruptcy was not an option. It had a $30 billion cash pile and plans to restructure the company as the economy rebounded and 2007 U.S. auto sales topped 16 million units.
Then came October. Sales plummeted an astounding 45% over the same period last year, a result of a slowing economy and a dearth of financing for would-be car buyers. Total U.S. car and light-truck sales this year could come in at 13.5 million, 2.6 million fewer than last year. "That's in nobody's business plan," says Kimberly Rodriguez, an automotive specialist with Grant Thornton. "The best planning in the world cannot survive that fluctuation." It's now clear that GM can't survive as an ongoing entity without massive federal assistance. The company is burning through more than $2 billion each month. It has $16 billion left. As if they were aboard a dirigible losing altitude, GM's bosses have been frantically throwing all manner of stuff overboard — retiree health-care benefits, people, assets, new car design — to conserve $5 billion. That will get it through the year. (Click here for a gallery on the 50 worst cars of all time.)
But 2009 is the year of reckoning for GM and the rest of the domestic auto industry, if not the economy as a whole. The GM crisis is raising once again the issue of how far the government should go in rescuing banks, insurance companies, mortgage holders, credit-card issuers and now carmakers. GM has no doubts about it. "Immediate federal funding is essential in order for the U.S. automotive industry to weather this downturn," GM president Fritz Henderson admitted to investors during a conference call in which GM announced a third-quarter loss of $2.5 billion.
No one is more aware of that need than Barack Obama, who carried Michigan by a huge margin. The President-elect is committed to helping the Detroit Three, and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is leading a rescue party that plans to get a bailout bill in front of President Bush before Thanksgiving. So far, the President has offered only to speed through Congress an already approved $25 billion loan to help Detroit create new fuel-efficient models. But GM needs an additional $10 billion simply to pay its bills next year and $15 billion more to close plants, compensate redundant workers and dump some of its lesser-performing brands.
The issue boils down to a historic proposition: Is what's good for GM still good for the country?
"If GM were to go into a free-fall bankruptcy and didn't pay its trade debts, then the entire domestic auto industry shuts down," says Rodriguez. The system — the domestic auto plants and their interconnected group of suppliers — is far bigger than GM. It includes 54 North American manufacturing plants and at least 4,000 so-called Tier 1 suppliers — firms that feed parts and subassemblies directly to those plants. That includes mom-and-pop outfits but also a dozen or so large companies such as Lear, Johnson Controls and GM's former captive Delphi. Beyond those are thousands of the suppliers' suppliers.
Although the Detroit Three directly employed about 240,000 people last year, according to the industry-allied Center for Automotive Research (CAR) in Ann Arbor, Mich., the multiplier effect is large, which is typical in manufacturing. Throw in the partsmakers and other suppliers, and you have an additional 974,000 jobs. Together, says CAR, these 1.2 million workers spend enough to keep 1.7 million more people employed. That gets you to 2.9 million jobs tied to the Detroit Three, and even if you discount the figures because of CAR's allegiance, it's a big number. Shut down Detroit, and the national unemployment rate heads toward 10% in a hurry. (Click here for Pictures of the Week.)
Even if just one of the Detroit Three — and GM is the most likely, as Ford is in better shape and Chrysler is much smaller — spiraled into a free-fall bankruptcy, the systemic effects, at least initially, would be huge. The whole industry would not be able to build cars in the U.S., because of the lack of parts. "Unlike the airlines or steel, when you look at the automobile industry and the fact that the whole supplier base is connected — to Ford, Chrysler, Toyota — it will have a ripple effect on the entire industry," says Nicole Y. Lamb-Hale, a bankruptcy expert at the Detroit office of Foley & Lardner, a law firm that represents some GM suppliers.
A carefully planned, prepackaged bankruptcy would still be troublesome, she says. Throwing 479,000 GM retirees onto the rolls of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., for instance, could overwhelm it. And GM's agreement to fund the United Auto Workers' voluntary employee beneficiary association (VEBA) — thus getting a $50 billion unfunded liability off its books — might then be in jeopardy, as would the union's health benefits. The VEBA has already saved GM nearly $5 billion in the past quarter, and still greater benefits lie ahead.
A bailout won't spare GM or its workers pain. Assuming the government bridges GM to the future — or provides debtor-in-possession financing in a bankruptcy — there is still a ton of restructuring to do. The company operates 21 plants in North America and has three more that are scheduled to close. But Grant Thornton's Rodriguez says that still leaves five to go to match demand. "They still need to take structural steps: reduce suppliers, reduce the number of plants, reduce the cost structure and get rid of excessive debt." Most analysts say GM has to dump underperforming brands too.
Shutting down plants and cutting labor are costly — it's one of the ironies of the auto business. Deutsche Bank estimates that GM would have to spend $12 billion to chop labor costs and compensate dealers who lose their franchises. That would lower GM's North American operating costs from the current $31 billion to $25 billion annually, says Deutsche Bank. (Click here for pictures of the global financial crisis.)
None of this can happen without the cooperation of the UAW, which is probably feeling better knowing that Obama is on his way to Washington. Although it hasn't shown its hand, the UAW may try to mitigate job losses in the U.S. by pushing GM and Ford to build fewer vehicles in Mexico, according to Sean McAlinden, chief economist at CAR. Obama might be sympathetic to that argument; he said during the campaign that NAFTA needed to be re-examined. The carrot for GM is that any new workers it hires in the U.S. will make $13 to $14 an hour and collect limited benefits rather than work for $29 an hour and get full benefits — the old UAW wage.
There's also a legitimate question as to who would do the restructuring. GM CEO Rick Wagoner has made the case that his crew is best placed to run the turnaround since it knows where the cost buttons are. But critics like Jim Schrager at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business say the wrong people are in charge: "I think you would only put money in GM if you had a complete change in the board and the current management. They are diligent. They worked very hard, but it just hasn't worked." In Schrager's view, GM is a strategic failure. It can manufacture high-quality cars, but it neither makes the right kind nor markets them effectively. He'd bust the company up into three independent firms: Chevy, Buick-Pontiac-GMC and Cadillac-Saab-Saturn.
If that's ultimately where Detroit ends up, is it worth the price to get there? Put another way, does GM deserve to be bailed out or left at the mercy of the market and almost certain death? "The University of Chicago training in me says the market should prevail," says Schrager. "But the Chrysler bailout was a success, and, gosh, I'd love to save it." That sentiment is not shared by everyone, and it goes to the heart of the central economic debate facing the country — between hard-nosed capitalists, who believe the market should decide, and public-policy types who view the economy as something far more organic than a balance sheet. But ultimately, whether GM is dead or alive, the taxpayers are on the hook for billions, for everything from lost tax revenues to higher unemployment costs to taking over GM's pension obligations. The decision that Washington has to make is whether we pay for GM's survival or for its funeral.
— With reporting by Joseph R. Szczesny/Detroit
By Bill Saporito Thursday, Nov. 13, 2008
For months, General Motors had been telling everyone who would listen that bankruptcy was not an option. It had a $30 billion cash pile and plans to restructure the company as the economy rebounded and 2007 U.S. auto sales topped 16 million units.
Then came October. Sales plummeted an astounding 45% over the same period last year, a result of a slowing economy and a dearth of financing for would-be car buyers. Total U.S. car and light-truck sales this year could come in at 13.5 million, 2.6 million fewer than last year. "That's in nobody's business plan," says Kimberly Rodriguez, an automotive specialist with Grant Thornton. "The best planning in the world cannot survive that fluctuation." It's now clear that GM can't survive as an ongoing entity without massive federal assistance. The company is burning through more than $2 billion each month. It has $16 billion left. As if they were aboard a dirigible losing altitude, GM's bosses have been frantically throwing all manner of stuff overboard — retiree health-care benefits, people, assets, new car design — to conserve $5 billion. That will get it through the year. (Click here for a gallery on the 50 worst cars of all time.)
But 2009 is the year of reckoning for GM and the rest of the domestic auto industry, if not the economy as a whole. The GM crisis is raising once again the issue of how far the government should go in rescuing banks, insurance companies, mortgage holders, credit-card issuers and now carmakers. GM has no doubts about it. "Immediate federal funding is essential in order for the U.S. automotive industry to weather this downturn," GM president Fritz Henderson admitted to investors during a conference call in which GM announced a third-quarter loss of $2.5 billion.
No one is more aware of that need than Barack Obama, who carried Michigan by a huge margin. The President-elect is committed to helping the Detroit Three, and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is leading a rescue party that plans to get a bailout bill in front of President Bush before Thanksgiving. So far, the President has offered only to speed through Congress an already approved $25 billion loan to help Detroit create new fuel-efficient models. But GM needs an additional $10 billion simply to pay its bills next year and $15 billion more to close plants, compensate redundant workers and dump some of its lesser-performing brands.
The issue boils down to a historic proposition: Is what's good for GM still good for the country?
"If GM were to go into a free-fall bankruptcy and didn't pay its trade debts, then the entire domestic auto industry shuts down," says Rodriguez. The system — the domestic auto plants and their interconnected group of suppliers — is far bigger than GM. It includes 54 North American manufacturing plants and at least 4,000 so-called Tier 1 suppliers — firms that feed parts and subassemblies directly to those plants. That includes mom-and-pop outfits but also a dozen or so large companies such as Lear, Johnson Controls and GM's former captive Delphi. Beyond those are thousands of the suppliers' suppliers.
Although the Detroit Three directly employed about 240,000 people last year, according to the industry-allied Center for Automotive Research (CAR) in Ann Arbor, Mich., the multiplier effect is large, which is typical in manufacturing. Throw in the partsmakers and other suppliers, and you have an additional 974,000 jobs. Together, says CAR, these 1.2 million workers spend enough to keep 1.7 million more people employed. That gets you to 2.9 million jobs tied to the Detroit Three, and even if you discount the figures because of CAR's allegiance, it's a big number. Shut down Detroit, and the national unemployment rate heads toward 10% in a hurry. (Click here for Pictures of the Week.)
Even if just one of the Detroit Three — and GM is the most likely, as Ford is in better shape and Chrysler is much smaller — spiraled into a free-fall bankruptcy, the systemic effects, at least initially, would be huge. The whole industry would not be able to build cars in the U.S., because of the lack of parts. "Unlike the airlines or steel, when you look at the automobile industry and the fact that the whole supplier base is connected — to Ford, Chrysler, Toyota — it will have a ripple effect on the entire industry," says Nicole Y. Lamb-Hale, a bankruptcy expert at the Detroit office of Foley & Lardner, a law firm that represents some GM suppliers.
A carefully planned, prepackaged bankruptcy would still be troublesome, she says. Throwing 479,000 GM retirees onto the rolls of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., for instance, could overwhelm it. And GM's agreement to fund the United Auto Workers' voluntary employee beneficiary association (VEBA) — thus getting a $50 billion unfunded liability off its books — might then be in jeopardy, as would the union's health benefits. The VEBA has already saved GM nearly $5 billion in the past quarter, and still greater benefits lie ahead.
A bailout won't spare GM or its workers pain. Assuming the government bridges GM to the future — or provides debtor-in-possession financing in a bankruptcy — there is still a ton of restructuring to do. The company operates 21 plants in North America and has three more that are scheduled to close. But Grant Thornton's Rodriguez says that still leaves five to go to match demand. "They still need to take structural steps: reduce suppliers, reduce the number of plants, reduce the cost structure and get rid of excessive debt." Most analysts say GM has to dump underperforming brands too.
Shutting down plants and cutting labor are costly — it's one of the ironies of the auto business. Deutsche Bank estimates that GM would have to spend $12 billion to chop labor costs and compensate dealers who lose their franchises. That would lower GM's North American operating costs from the current $31 billion to $25 billion annually, says Deutsche Bank. (Click here for pictures of the global financial crisis.)
None of this can happen without the cooperation of the UAW, which is probably feeling better knowing that Obama is on his way to Washington. Although it hasn't shown its hand, the UAW may try to mitigate job losses in the U.S. by pushing GM and Ford to build fewer vehicles in Mexico, according to Sean McAlinden, chief economist at CAR. Obama might be sympathetic to that argument; he said during the campaign that NAFTA needed to be re-examined. The carrot for GM is that any new workers it hires in the U.S. will make $13 to $14 an hour and collect limited benefits rather than work for $29 an hour and get full benefits — the old UAW wage.
There's also a legitimate question as to who would do the restructuring. GM CEO Rick Wagoner has made the case that his crew is best placed to run the turnaround since it knows where the cost buttons are. But critics like Jim Schrager at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business say the wrong people are in charge: "I think you would only put money in GM if you had a complete change in the board and the current management. They are diligent. They worked very hard, but it just hasn't worked." In Schrager's view, GM is a strategic failure. It can manufacture high-quality cars, but it neither makes the right kind nor markets them effectively. He'd bust the company up into three independent firms: Chevy, Buick-Pontiac-GMC and Cadillac-Saab-Saturn.
If that's ultimately where Detroit ends up, is it worth the price to get there? Put another way, does GM deserve to be bailed out or left at the mercy of the market and almost certain death? "The University of Chicago training in me says the market should prevail," says Schrager. "But the Chrysler bailout was a success, and, gosh, I'd love to save it." That sentiment is not shared by everyone, and it goes to the heart of the central economic debate facing the country — between hard-nosed capitalists, who believe the market should decide, and public-policy types who view the economy as something far more organic than a balance sheet. But ultimately, whether GM is dead or alive, the taxpayers are on the hook for billions, for everything from lost tax revenues to higher unemployment costs to taking over GM's pension obligations. The decision that Washington has to make is whether we pay for GM's survival or for its funeral.
— With reporting by Joseph R. Szczesny/Detroit
